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Abstract
This paper examines strategic information revelation in a Cournot duopoly
with incomplete information about ﬁrm 1’s cost and information precision.
Firm 2 relies on certiﬁable and ex post submissions of ﬁrm 1, without nec-
essarily knowing whether ﬁrm 1 knows its cost or not. The sequential equilibria
of the induced communication game are determined for diﬀerent certiﬁability
possibilities. A perfectly revealing equilibrium in which information precision is
irrelevant is obtained under full certiﬁability. On the contrary, it is shown that if
only payoﬀ-relevant (fundamental) events can be certiﬁed, then the equilibrium
output and proﬁt of ﬁrm 1 decreases with its average information precision if
this ﬁrm is uninformed or if its cost is high. A consequence of this local eﬀect
is that information precision has, on average, no value for a ﬁrm.
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The purpose of this paper is to examine ﬁrms’ disclosure choices and inferences in
an industry with uncertainty concerning the quality of ﬁrms’ technology and infor-
mation precision. While it is well known that the revelation of information—and
hence, the equilibrium level of outputs—drastically depends on which type of infor-
mation can be disclosed, the eﬀects of competitors’ uncertainty concerning others’
information precision remain unexplored. This uncertainty about information pre-
cision, measured as the frequency of access to fundamental information, can vary
for various reasons. For example, ﬁrms can face and observe diﬀerent technological
shocks, they may have diﬀerent successes to technological innovations, they may
have uncertain and diﬀerent tax rates due to their stochastic polluting activities,
etc. Thus, they might have diﬀerent and not commonly known access to informa-
tion about their production costs. Alternatively, ﬁrms established in a market may
not know newcomers’ technology and may not know whether recently established
ﬁrms perfectly know their own technology.
To conduct our analysis, we consider a simple model of Cournot competition with
two ﬁrms, in which ﬁrm 1 observes private—possibly imperfect—information about
the state of its technology. For simplicity, we assume that either ﬁrm 1 perfectly
learns its cost, or receives no information about it. In this latter case, the only
“information” of ﬁrm 1 is that it does not know its cost. A priori, this information
is not received by ﬁrm 2, although it can be received in a latter stage from ﬁrm 1’s
voluntary disclosures. Hence, before the communication stage, ﬁrm 2 does not know
whether its rival is informed about its cost or not. The probability ° 2 [0;1] that
ﬁrm 1 receives an informative signal characterizes ﬁrm 2’s uncertainty concerning
ﬁrm 1’s information precision. Since this probability is known by ﬁrm 2, the average
precision of ﬁrm 1’s information is common knowledge, contrary to its form (the
informativeness about the cost) and, of course, its content (the cost itself).
After observing its private signal, ﬁrm 1 chooses whether to disclose and certify
some information to the other ﬁrm. We will assume that revealed information is
always certiﬁed (proved, or veriﬁable) and true. Such an assumption is common in
many papers dealing with strategic information revelation (Grossman, 1981; Mil-
grom, 1981; Okuno-Fujiwara, Postlewaite, and Suzumura, 1990; Shin, 1994; Lipman
and Seppi, 1995; Glazer and Rubinstein, 2001, is not an exhaustive list). It can be
justiﬁed in various economic or legal contexts, and it highlights several economic
2and behavioral phenomena which cannot be obtained otherwise. In particular, it il-
lustrates how agents update their beliefs when others remain silent.1 Moreover, the
restriction to truthful certiﬁed reports is compensated by the fact that all informa-
tion might not be certiﬁed. This certiﬁability conﬁguration is made explicit in the
model. Finally, information revelation remains voluntary, and might be strategically
partial and vague. In short, ﬁrms cannot lie but may try to withhold their informa-
tion by remaining silent or by revealing only favorable (albeit truthful) information.
In the model presented here, the following types of certiﬁability possibilities are
considered. In one extreme conﬁguration, neither ﬁrm 1’s cost nor its information
precision can be certiﬁed. Of course, communication is irrelevant in such a setting.
The other extreme conﬁguration allows everything to be certiﬁed. In between, the
most realistic conﬁguration corresponds to the one in which ﬁrm 1 can certify its cost
when it knows it, but is not able to certify that it is uninformed. This is possible, for
example, if ﬁrms can conduct laboratory experiments that eventually reveal their
technology and costs, but are not able to certify that the laboratory experiment was
unsuccessful.
In a second stage, the Cournot game in played according to the messages deliv-
ered in the communication stage. In this second-stage game, each ﬁrm chooses its
level of output given its initial information and the information revealed in the ﬁrst-
stage game. These output levels jointly determine the market price according to the
inverse demand function. Our approach concerning the revelation of information is
essentially the one of Okuno-Fujiwara et al. (1990). Contrary to models of informa-
tion sharing among oligopolists (as, e.g., Novshek and Sonnenschein, 1982; Clarke,
1983; Vives, 1984; Gal-Or, 1985; Shapiro, 1986; Malueg and Tsutsui, 1996, 1998)
we consider ex post incentives to share information, i.e., communication choices
are made at the interim stage, once speciﬁc information is received. This feature
is usually at variance with ex ante calculations which require binding contracts or
commitments, or a central agency ensuring the collect of market data and the reve-
lation of information. For example, ﬁrms may commit not to share information, but
once signals are received a ﬁrm may want to convince the rival that his own cost is
low to induce soft behavior on its part.
Under the assumption that all information can be certiﬁed, the only sequen-
1Actually, in interactive decision situations considered in this literature, cheap talk commu-
nication (communication where messages are non-binding, have no costs associated, and are not
certiﬁable) is not informative and cannot matter. The reason is that in a situation in which talk is
cheap, a ﬁrm would always want its rival to believe that it has the lowest costs.
3tial equilibrium of the two-stage game is shown to be perfectly revealing, whatever
the prior probabilities. Nevertheless, when only the cost (i.e., the fundamental and
physical characteristics of the economy) can be certiﬁed, and as long as ﬁrm 2 is not
sure that ﬁrm 1 is perfectly informed about its cost, the only sequential equilibrium
is a partially revealing equilibrium. In this particularly interesting conﬁguration, we
analyze the eﬀects of ﬁrm 1’s average information precision. This study is conducted
in the same line as Shin (1994), who investigated a decision maker’s inferences and
decision rules in presence of uncertainty concerning the precision of the informed
parties’ information. In short, he showed that the decision maker becomes more
skeptical when he knows that the average precision of the informed parties’ informa-
tion increases. A very similar phenomenon is obtained in our model. More precisely,
our main result is that the precision of ﬁrm 1’s information has two eﬀects: an av-
erage (global) eﬀect, and a local eﬀect. First, when ﬁrm 1’s average information
precision increases, more information is revealed, on average. In the limiting case in
which ° = 1, all information is revealed, i.e., ﬁrm 2 perfectly learns ﬁrm 1’s cost.
On the contrary, when ° = 0, ﬁrms are symmetrically informed and neither knows
ﬁrm 1’s cost. Hence, no information is revealed. Second, when the average precision
of ﬁrm 1’s information increases, ﬁrm 2 becomes more skeptical about ﬁrm 1’s tech-
nology, resulting in an increase of its production and proﬁts when ﬁrm 1 conceals its
information. However, it is shown that, on average, these eﬀects cancel each other
out. Hence, on average, the frequency of informative signals has no eﬀect. Said
diﬀerently, average productions and proﬁts of both ﬁrms do not depend on °.
The intuition of the eﬀects of ﬁrm 1’s average information precision on ﬁrm 2’s
inferences is relatively simple. First, when ﬁrm 1 reveals its low cost to the com-
petitor, it reduces the competitor production. Hence, since outputs are strategic
substitutes, ﬁrm 1’s output and proﬁt increase. Second, when ﬁrm 1 has a high
cost, it has no incentive to reveal it since it will induce the competitor to “over-
produce”. Consequently, ﬁrm 1 will have an incentive to reveal its cost if and only
if this cost is low. Knowing that the cost is revealed if and only if it is low, there
are two possibilities when ﬁrm 2 does not receive information from ﬁrm 1: either
ﬁrm 1 is genuinely uninformed, or its cost is high. When the average precision of
ﬁrm 1’s information increases, i.e., when there are less uncertainties about ﬁrm 1’s
information, the possibility that the cost is high becomes more likely. Therefore,
ﬁrm 2 puts more weight on the alternative that ﬁrm 1 knows that its cost is high,
4i.e., it becomes more skeptical about ﬁrm 1’s cost. As a result, when nothing has
been revealed, ﬁrm 2’s production and proﬁt increase, whereas ﬁrm 1’s production
and proﬁt decrease.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the Cournot game.
In Section 3, we deﬁne the communication game and associated sequential equilib-
ria. These equilibria in presence of various information structures and certiﬁability
possibilities are analyzed in Sections 4 and 5. In Section 6 we study the eﬀects of
information precision. Finally, we conclude in Section 7. Proofs of the propositions
can be found in the Appendix.
2 The Cournot Game
We consider a duopoly playing Cournot competition in which each ﬁrm i 2 N =
f1;2g can produce according to a constant marginal cost ¸i. The two ﬁrms produce
identical products and face a linear (inverse) demand function p(q1 + q2) = a ¡
b(q1 +q2), where qi 2 R+ is ﬁrm i’s output and a, b > 0 are parameters. The utility




(p(q1 + q2)qi ¡ ¸iqi)
= qi(¡µi ¡ q1 ¡ q2);
where µi = ¸i¡a
b . We call µi ﬁrm i’s cost, even if µi is an aﬃne and increasing
transformation of the cost ¸i. We assume for simplicity that µ2 = ¡1 and µ1 2



























Associated payoﬀs are uN
i (µ1) = (qN
i (µ1))
2, for i 2 N and µ1 2 [¡2;¡1=2]. For
example, if µ1 = µ2 = ¡1 (ﬁrms are symmetric), then q1 = q2 = 1
3. If µ1 = ¡1
2
(ﬁrm 1 has a high cost), then ﬁrm 1 does not produce, and ﬁrm 2 is a monopoly
producing q2 = 1
2. Finally, if µ1 = ¡3
2 (ﬁrm 1 has a low cost), then q1 = 2
3 and q2 = 1
6.
More generally, an increase in µ1 decreases ﬁrm 1’s output, increases ﬁrm 2’s output,
and increases the equilibrium market price.
Figure 1 represents ﬁrms’ reaction functions and the Nash equilibria depending


















Figure 1: Nash Equilibrium Outputs with Complete Information.
We introduce incomplete information by assuming that µ1 is determined by a
state of the world ! 2 Ω. Firm 2’s cost µ2 = ¡1 remains common knowledge
throughout the analysis. The cost of ﬁrm 1 can be low or high, i.e., µ1 2 Θ1 =
fµL
1 ;µH
1 g, where ¡1
2 ¸ µH
1 > µ2 = ¡1 > µL
1 ¸ ¡2.2 This cost is determined by a
function ¿ : Ω ! Θ1. We denote by p the probability distribution over Ω, where
p(!) > 0 for all ! 2 Ω. The partition of ﬁrm 1 over Ω is denoted by H1. An
information set h1(!) 2 H1 contains all states ﬁrm 1 considers as possible when the
2To simplify the exposition, we assume that ﬁrm 1 has only two possible cost realizations. The
analysis extends obviously to several levels of costs in the interval [¡2;¡1=2].
6real state is ! 2 Ω. We will always assume that ﬁrm 2 has no a priori information
about Ω, i.e., its partition is H2 = fΩg. The prior probability that ﬁrm 1 has a low
cost is given by any ¯ 2 ]0;1[, and will never be speciﬁed throughout the analysis.
Utility functions are extended to R+
2 £Ω by ui(q1;q2;!) ´ qi(¡¿(!)¡q1 ¡q2), for
all i 2 f1;2g. Hence, ﬁrm i’s expected utility at ! is given by Ep(ui(q1;q2;¢) j hi(!)).
3 Certiﬁability and Communication
In this section we deﬁne the sequential equilibria of the two-stage game according
to the information structure and certiﬁability possibilities. In the communication
stage, a report (or message) by ﬁrm 1 is a nonempty subset x µ Ω, interpreted as an
assertion by the ﬁrm that the state of the world belongs to x. We denote by X(!)
the set of reports that can be certiﬁed by the ﬁrm when the real state of the world
is !. The constraint that the ﬁrm must report truthfully implies that for all ! 2 Ω
and x 2 X(!) we have h1(!) µ x. In other words, ﬁrm 1 can only reveal events it
knows. The set of all certiﬁable reports is denoted by X =
S
!2Ω X(!). Note that it
is suﬃcient to consider reports which are an union of ﬁrm 1’s information sets, i.e.,
X is a subset of the ¾-algebra generated by ﬁrm 1’s partition H1. A communication
strategy is a H1 measurable function c : Ω ! X with the property that c(!) 2 X(!)
for all ! 2 Ω. When all truthful messages can be sent, then ﬁrm 1’s report can be
very precise concerning its information, as when c(!) = h1(!), but it can also be
very vague, as when c(!) = Ω.
Second-stage strategies specify the quantities produced by the ﬁrms after the
communication stage. Formally, a second-stage or payoﬀ-relevant strategy of ﬁrm 1
is a function ¾1 : X £ Ω ! R+ such that ¾1(x;¢) : Ω ! R+ is measurable with
respect to H1 for all x 2 X. A second-stage strategy of ﬁrm 2 is a function ¾2 :
X ! R+. Thus, ¾1(x;!) and ¾2(x) are the quantities produced by the ﬁrms at !
when ﬁrm 1 has reported x. Given a report x, let I(x) be an nonempty subset of x
representing the conjecture reached by ﬁrm 2 concerning ﬁrm 1’s cost. This means
that when ﬁrm 1 reveals x, ﬁrm 2 will conclude that ! 2 I(x). It is assumed that
I(x) =
S
!2I(x) h1(!), i.e., the conjecture made by ﬁrm 2 is consistent with ﬁrm 1’s
information.
For the communication game presented here, a sequential equilibrium is a triple
((¾i)i2N;c;I);
7satisfying the following conditions:












(iii) For every x in the range of c, I(x) = c¡1(x).
Condition (i) states that ﬁrms’ outputs are part of a Bayesian equilibrium of
the continuation Bayesian games generated by communication. That is, strategies
are optimal in the Cournot competition contingent on the information exchanged.
According to condition (ii), ﬁrm 1 reveals an optimal message given the continuation
Bayesian equilibria. Finally, condition (iii) is the “rational expectation” condition,
stating that ﬁrm 2 uses Bayes’ rule to update its belief along the equilibrium path.
In the following sections we analyze the Bayesian-Nash equilibria as well as strate-
gic information revelation (through the sequential equilibrium deﬁned above) for
diﬀerent kinds of information structures and certiﬁability possibilities.
4 Perfect Information Precision
To begin with, we consider the simplest incomplete information structure where
Ω = f!1;!2g, H1 = ff!1g;f!2gg, H2 = ff!1;!2gg, ¿(!1) = µL
1 , and ¿(!2) = µH
1 .
This means that ﬁrm 1 always knows its cost, ﬁrm 2 does not know ﬁrm 1’s cost, and
this is common knowledge. This is the standard form of asymmetric information of
economic models. It incorporates asymmetry about fundamentals, not about others’
knowledge.




1 be the average of its cost. This incomplete information game is essen-
tially a version of Okuno-Fujiwara et al. (1990, Example 1) without speciﬁc prior
8probabilities.3 In the Bayesian equilibrium, best responses are determined by
q1(q2;!) 2argmax
q1







1 ¡ q1(!1) ¡ q2
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1 = ¯q1(!1) + (1 ¡ ¯)q1(!2) is the expected output of ﬁrm 1. We obtain











Then, at the Bayesian equilibrium the (information-contingent) quantities produced






















and ﬁrm 1’s utility at ! 2 Ω is uB
1 (!) = (qB
1 (!))
2. Hence, the output of ﬁrm 2 is
increasing in the expected cost of its rival, while the output of ﬁrm 1 is decreasing
with its own cost. This equilibrium is best explained by referring to Figure 2 on
the next page, which represents ﬁrms’ reaction functions and the Bayesian-Nash





3Actually, Okuno-Fujiwara et al. (1990) provided suﬃcient conditions for the existence of per-
fectly revealing equilibria which are satisﬁed in this section when low cost can be certiﬁed. Hence,
the proof of the ﬁrst part of Proposition 1 is needless.
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1 ) < uB
1 (!2):
As an intuitive consequence we might expect that ﬁrm 1 would like to convince
the rival that it has low cost by revealing its cost when it is low (at !1) but not
when it is high (at !2). Consequently, there should be a perfectly revealing sequen-
tial equilibrium of the communication game as long as low cost can be certiﬁed.
Graphically, when ﬁrm 1 reveals its cost when it is low, we move from the original
outcome E to the outcome E0 in Figure 2. Hence, ﬁrm 2 contracts its output to
the beneﬁt of ﬁrm 1 and the price increases since the combined output decreases.
Therefore, when the cost is low, ﬁrm 1 has an incentive to reveal its cost. On the
contrary, ﬁrm 1 has no incentive to reveal its cost when it is high. This can be
seen in Figure 2 because a move from F to F0 is unfavorable to ﬁrm 1. The next
proposition asserts that the unique equilibrium is indeed perfectly revealing as long





















Figure 2: Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium Outputs with Incomplete Information.
Proposition 1 Assume that ﬁrm 1 always knows its cost and that ﬁrm 2 does not
know it.
1. If ﬁrm 1 can certify its cost when it is low (i.e., f!1g 2 X) then the unique
sequential equilibrium is perfectly revealing.
102. If ﬁrm 1 cannot certify its cost when it is low (i.e., f!1g = 2 X) then the unique
sequential equilibrium is non-revealing.
We see that ﬁrm 1 with a high cost is better oﬀ when the other ﬁrm does not
know it. On the contrary, ﬁrm 1 with a low cost prefers that ﬁrm 2 knows it (in
order to induce ﬁrm 2 to produce less). Therefore, when its cost is low ﬁrm 1 reveals
it. When ﬁrm 2 observes that ﬁrm 1 remains silent, ﬁrm 2 deduces that the cost is
high. Hence, the unravelling argument applies once again in this context.
However this argument fails when ﬁrm 1 does not know its cost in some states
and cannot certify that it does not know it. In this case, when nothing is revealed by
ﬁrm 1, ﬁrm 2 cannot deduce that the cost is high, leading to a failure of perfect reve-
lation. The next section shows this phenomena, in the same line as Okuno-Fujiwara
et al. (1990, Example 3), but with arbitrary prior probabilities and arbitrary infor-
mation precision for ﬁrm 1. Hence, our framework allows us to investigate the eﬀect
of ﬁrm 1’s information precision on ﬁrm 2’s inferences.
5 Partial Information Precision
We consider the same framework as in the previous section, except that we allow
the possibility that ﬁrm 1 might not know its own cost. There are four states of
the world, and the initial information structure is H1 = ff!1g;f!2g;f!3;!4gg and
H2 = fΩg, where ¿(!1) = ¿(!3) = µL
1 and ¿(!2) = ¿(!4) = µH
1 . That is, ﬁrm 1
knows its cost at !1 and !2, but does not know it at !3 and !4. Firm 2 does
not know whether ﬁrm 1 knows its cost or not, and this is common knowledge
between both ﬁrms. The payoﬀ-relevant certiﬁability level is characterized by a set
of messages X = ff!1g;f!2g;Ωg. This means that only payoﬀ-relevant events can
be certiﬁed: the event f!3;!4g = Ωnf! : h1(!) µ f!1;!2gg (ﬁrm 1 does not know
its cost) cannot be certiﬁed. The payoﬀ-relevant certiﬁability level is reasonable
since it does not permit the diﬃcult task consisting in certifying that one does not
know something. As will be seen, allowing or not payoﬀ-relevant information to be
revealed will drastically modify equilibrium outcomes.
Denote by ° 2 ]0;1[ the probability that ﬁrm 1 is informed about its cost, i.e.,
p(f!1;!2g) = °. As before, ¯ is the probability that ﬁrm 1’s cost is low, i.e.,
p(f!1;!3g) = ¯. Then, prior probabilities of the states of the world are
11p(!1) = ¯° p(!3) = ¯(1 ¡ °)
p(!2) = (1 ¡ ¯)° p(!4) = (1 ¡ ¯)(1 ¡ °):
With this new information structure, the Bayesian equilibrium is determined by
q1(q2;!) 2 argmax
q1
fq1(¡¿(!) ¡ q1 ¡ q2)g; if ! = !1, !2,
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where, as before, µM
1 = ¯µL
1 +(1¡¯)µH
1 .4 At the Bayesian equilibrium, outputs are




























Associated payoﬀs of ﬁrm 1 at ! 2 Ω is uB
1 (!) = (qB
1 (!))
2. The next proposition
shows the inﬂuence of certiﬁability on the incentive to reveal information, and thus
4Notice that since q1(q2;!3) or q1(q2;!4) is an average of ﬁrm 1’s best response at !1 and !2,
q2(q1) is also the best response of ﬁrm 2 when ﬁrm 2 knows that ﬁrm 1 knows its cost.
12on equilibrium outputs.
Proposition 2 Assume that ﬁrm 2 does not know whether ﬁrm 1 knows its cost or
not, and that ﬁrm 2 does not know ﬁrm 1’s cost.
1. If ﬁrm 1 can certify its cost and that it does not know its cost, i.e.,
X = ff!1g;f!2g;f!3;!4g;Ωg;
then the unique sequential equilibrium is perfectly revealing. Hence, outputs
and utilities are the same as those with complete information.
2. With the payoﬀ-relevant certiﬁability level (i.e., X = ff!1g;f!2g;Ωg) the
unique sequential equilibrium is partially revealing: ﬁrm 2 learns the cost iff
it is low (and ﬁrm 1 knows it). In this partially revealing equilibrium outputs
and utilities are
qP








(¯(1 + 3°) ¡ 4)µH





1 (!3) = qP




(1 ¡ ¯)(3°¯ ¡ 4)µH














1 + ¯(1 ¡ °)µL
1
3(1 ¡ ¯°)
, if ! 6= !1,
and uP
i (!) = (qP
i (!))
2, for all i 2 N and ! 2 Ω.
3. If ﬁrm 1 cannot certify its cost when it is low (i.e., f!1g = 2 X) then ﬁrm 2
keeps its prior probabilities about ﬁrm 1’s cost. Hence, outputs and utilities
are the same as those with incomplete information.
6 Inferences and Outcomes at the Partially Revealing
Equilibrium
In this section we analyze into more details the partially revealing equilibrium found
in the second part of Proposition 2. We consider the states of the world ! 6= !1 since
13at !1 we get the same outputs and beliefs as in the Nash equilibrium with complete
information. Hence, we consider the states in which ﬁrm 1 reveals nothing. In this
case, ﬁrm 2 considers as possible only the states ! 6= !1. By denoting ¹ its belief
about ﬁrm 1’s cost µ1 2 fµL
1 ;µH
1 g and by using Bayes’ rule, we get
¹(µL








Therefore, when the precision of ﬁrm 1’s information increases (° increases),
ﬁrm 2 puts more weight on µH
1 . In other words, when the precision of ﬁrm 1’s
information increases, ﬁrm 2 is more skeptical about ﬁrm 1’s technology when this
latter remains silent. Hence, its beliefs that ﬁrm 1 has a high cost increases, resulting
in more production by ﬁrm 2 and less production by ﬁrm 1. We get the main result
of this paper:
Proposition 3 Assume that ﬁrm 2 does not know whether ﬁrm 1 knows its cost
or not, that ﬁrm 2 does not know ﬁrm 1’s cost, and that only fundamental (payoﬀ-
relevant) information can be revealed by ﬁrm 1. Then, at equilibrium, if nothing has
been revealed by ﬁrm 1 (i.e., either ﬁrm 1 has a high cost or does not know its cost):
1. Firm 2’s belief ¹(µL
1 ) that ﬁrm 1’s cost is low is decreasing with ﬁrm 1’s
information precision °. Firm 2’s belief ¹(µH
1 ) that ﬁrm 1’s cost is high is increasing
with ﬁrm 1’s information precision °.
2. Firm 1’s output and proﬁt are decreasing with ﬁrm 1’s information precision °,
whereas ﬁrm 2’s output and proﬁt are increasing with ﬁrm 1’s information precision.
The last proposition states that information precision is unfavorable to ﬁrm 1 in
states of the world in which it has no incentive to communicate. What is the average
eﬀect of ﬁrm 1 information precision on ﬁrms’ production and proﬁts? To answer
this question we have to compute how average productions and proﬁts change with
the probability ° that ﬁrm 1 is informed. From the second part of Proposition 2,





















That is, average outputs are the same as those with complete information. This
is interesting since it implies that the average access of information of ﬁrm 1 has
no eﬀect, on average, on its proﬁt. Hence, even if the ﬁrm has, on average, better
access to information, it does not improve its proﬁt: for any ° 2 [0;1], its average
proﬁt is the same. The reason for this phenomenon is due to two opposite eﬀects.
A positive and global eﬀect of an increase of the frequency of information precision
for ﬁrm 1 results from the fact that, when its cost is low, it can certify it more often.
However, at the same time, when its cost is high and it knows it, or when it does
not know its cost, no revelation will result in more skeptical beliefs and thus more
production by ﬁrm 2. On average, as shown, these eﬀects cancel each other out, for
any ° 2 [0;1].
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have provided several results useful for understanding the role of
higher-order uncertainty in Cournot games with information revelation possibilities.
For example, we have shown that an increase of a ﬁrm’s average access to fundamen-
tal information about its cost has two eﬀects when information revelation is possible.
On the one hand, an increase of the ﬁrm’s average information precision enables this
ﬁrm to convince more frequently its competitor that it has a low cost. On the other
hand, a more subtle and indirect eﬀect results in more skeptical beliefs from the
competitor in the face of silence. Hence, when ﬁrm 1 conceals its information (i.e.,
when its cost is high or when the ﬁrm does not know its cost) an increase of the ﬁrm
average information precision reduces its production and proﬁt to the advantage
of its rival. As shown, these eﬀects cancel each other out on average. This might
imply that if a ﬁrm has the possibility to invest in costly R&D expenses to learn its
technology (not to improve it), it will not do so since on average, there is no gain
from more precise information.
There are various ways in which our analysis can be extended. One possibility is
15to consider a more general information structure, as in Shin (1994), in which there
are more than two possibilities of information precision. Indeed, in the Cournot game
presented here, ﬁrm 1 is either perfectly informed about its cost or not informed at
all. However, the qualitative results will remain the same. An increase of the average
precision of ﬁrm 1 will lead to greater skepticism in the face of vagueness. An other
possibility is to consider more than two ﬁrms, each one having private information
about its cost, and various access to information. Some other interesting phenomena
might emerge, although we expect that ﬁrms’ inference should remain qualitatively
similar. From our point of view, more interesting extensions should be to consider
more general demand functions, or to consider uncertainty about others’ information
precision concerning other parameters of the industry, like the slope or intercept of
demand. There are various concrete contexts in which ﬁrms do not know the exact
estimate of other ﬁrms about the state of demand in their sector. An analysis of
incentives to disclose information should be fruitful in such contexts.
Appendix. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. We ﬁrst show the second part of the proposition. As-
sume that X = ff!2g;Ωg (the result is obvious if X = fΩg). If the sequential
equilibrium is perfectly revealing then c1(!2) = f!2g and c1(!1) = Ω. Firm 1’s
payoﬀ at !2 is uN
1 (µH





. If ﬁrm 1 deviates, i.e., reveals Ω, then ﬁrm 2
knows (wrongly) f!1g by Bayesian updating, and thus ﬁrm 2 plays qN
2 (µL
1 ). Play-
ing rationally against qN
2 (µL



















since ¡1=2 ¸ µH
1 > µL
1 . Therefore, ﬁrm 1 deviates from full
revelation, and the perfectly revealing communication strategy is not an equilibrium.
On the contrary, if c1(!2) = Ω, then by deviating at !2 ﬁrm 1 gets uN
1 (µH
1 ) by the
certiﬁability constraint, which is smaller than uB
1 (!2).
Now, to show the ﬁrst part of the proposition, assume that f!1g 2 X, i.e., ﬁrm 1
can certify its cost when it is low. We begin to show that there is a perfectly revealing
equilibrium where c1(!1) = f!1g and c1(!2) = Ω, i.e., ﬁrm 1 reveals its cost only if
it is low.5 In this case the conjecture of ﬁrm 2 is uniquely deﬁned (I(f!g) = f!g
for all ! and I(Ω) = f!2g). Rational communication is veriﬁed if ﬁrm 1 does not
deviate when its cost is low (at !2 ﬁrm 1 cannot modify the information structure),
5There is also a perfectly revealing equilibrium in which c1(!) = f!g for all ! 2 Ω.
16i.e., if uN
1 (µL



















. This last inequality is veriﬁed since ¡1=2 ¸ µH
1 > µL
1 .
To show that all sequential equilibria are perfectly revealing, assume on the
contrary that c1(!1) = c1(!2) = Ω. We immediately see that ﬁrm 1 deviates at !1
by revealing f!1g since uN
1 (µL
1 ) > uB
1 (!1). This completes the proof. ¤
Proof of Proposition 2.
1. To show that there exists a perfectly revealing equilibrium, let c1(!1) = f!1g,
c1(!2) = Ω, c1(!3) = c1(!4) = f!3;!4g, I(x) = f!2g if !2 2 x, I(x) = f!3;!4g
if !3;!4 2 x and !2 = 2 x, and I(f!1g) = f!1g. Firm 1 does not deviate at !1
by revealing x 3 !2 if uN
1 (µL







1 );!1) which was veriﬁed
in the Proof of Proposition 1; ﬁrm 1 does not deviate by revealing x such that
!3;!4 2 x and !2 = 2 x because uN
1 (µL
1 ) ¸ uB
1 (!1). At !2 ﬁrm 1 cannot modify
the information structure, and thus it does not deviate. At !3 (or at !4), if ﬁrm 1
deviates by revealing x 63 !2, the information structure is not modiﬁed. If it deviates
by revealing x 3 !2 its expected utility becomes q1(¡µM








2 is the best response of ﬁrm 1 against qN
2 (µH







, which is smaller than its expected utility uB
1 (!3) when
ﬁrm 1 does not deviate. To show that all equilibria are perfectly revealing, let
c1(!1) = c1(!2) or (and) c1(!1) = c1(!3). In this case it is easy to check that ﬁrm 1
deviates by revealing f!1g (the argument is the same as the one given in the Proof
of Proposition 1).
2. The fact that no revelation at all is not an equilibrium is obtained as before.
To show that the perfectly revealing communication strategy c(!1) = f!1g, c(!2) =
f!2g, c(!3) = c(!4) = Ω does not constitute an equilibrium, let !2 be the state of
the world (i.e., ﬁrm 1 has a high cost and knows it). By revealing its cost its payoﬀ is
uN
1 (µH





. If ﬁrm 1 deviates, i.e., reveals Ω, then ﬁrm 2 knows (wrongly)
f!3;!4g by Bayesian updating, and thus ﬁrm 2 plays qB
2 (!3). Playing rationally
against qB

















since ¡1=2 ¸ µH
1 > µL
1 . Therefore, ﬁrm 1 deviates from full revelation, and
the perfectly revealing communication strategy is not an equilibrium. It remains to
check that if ﬁrm 1 uses the communication strategy c satisfying c(!1) = f!1g and
c(!) = Ω for all ! 6= !1, then it has no incentive to deviate. To this aim, we ﬁrst have
to determine the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium when such a communication strategy
is used. Of course, at !1, payoﬀs are the same as in the Nash equilibrium. Hence,
17we have to determine the outputs qP
1 (!2), qP
1 (!3) = qP
1 (!4) and qP
2 (!), ! 6= !1,
when Ω has been revealed, i.e., when ﬁrm 2’s conjecture is I(Ω) = f!2;!3;!4g. Best
responses of ﬁrm 1 are the same as in the Bayesian game without communication
since its information is the same (Equations (2) and (3)). Firm 2’s best response is
argmax
q2
f(1 ¡ ¯)°q2(1 ¡ q1(!2) ¡ q2) + (1 ¡ °)q2(1 ¡ q1(!3) ¡ q2)g
=
¡1 + °(¯ + (1 ¡ ¯)q1(!2)) + (1 ¡ °)q1(!3)
2(¯° ¡ 1)
:
Solving this equation for q2 using Equations (2) and (3) we get the following equi-







1 + ¯(1 ¡ °)µL
1
3(1 ¡ ¯°)
; ! 6= !1:




1 ) · qP
2 (!) · qN
2 (µH
1 ); ! 6= !1:
Substituting this equilibrium value into Equations (2) and (3) we get the following
equilibrium outputs for ﬁrm 1:
qP




(¯(1 + 3°) ¡ 4)µH





1 (!3) = qP




(1 ¡ ¯)(3°¯ ¡ 4)µH




In this equilibrium, ﬁrm 1’s utility is
uP




1 (!3) = uP




and, of course, uP
1 (!1) = uN
1 (µL
1 ). We have to verify that ﬁrm 1 does not deviate at
!1 by revealing nothing (i.e., Ω) and does not deviate at !2 by revealing that its cost
is high (i.e., f!2g). If ﬁrm 1 deviates at !1, then ﬁrm 2 produces qP
2 at !1 (because
18I(Ω) = f!2;!3;!4g). Since qP
2 ¸ qN
2 (µL
1 ), the optimal production of ﬁrm 1 decreases
(q1 is decreasing in q2 from the best reply given in Equation (2)). Hence, ﬁrm 1’s
utility also decreases. If ﬁrm 1 deviates at !2, then ﬁrm 2 produces qN
1 (µH
2 ) ¸ qP
2 ,
and thus ﬁrm 1’s utility also decreases for the same reason.
3. The proof is similar to the one of Proposition 1: with high cost ﬁrm 1 has no
incentive to reveal its information, and when ﬁrm 1 does not know its cost ﬁrm 1 is
indiﬀerent between revealing or not that it knows its cost. In any case, the cost is
not revealed and ﬁrm 2 keeps its prior beliefs. ¤
Proof of Proposition 3. Property 1 is obvious from the preceding analysis. To
get property 2 it suﬃces to remark that qP
2 (!), with ! 6= !1, is increasing in °, and
thus qP
1 (!2) and qP
1 (!3) = qP
1 (!4) are decreasing in °. ¤
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